Assault

Forcible confinement is set out in section 279(2) of the Criminal Code. A person commits the offence when, without lawful authority, they confine, imprison, or forcibly seize another person. The confinement does not need to involve a locked room or physical bindings. Any deprivation of a person's liberty, for any significant period, can meet the definition if the accused caused it without legal justification.

The Supreme Court of Canada puts it this way: a person is unlawfully confined if, for any significant period of time, they were coercively restrained or directed contrary to their wishes, so that they could not move about according to their own inclination and desire (R v Pritchard, 2008 SCC 59).

Yes. Forcible confinement, unlawful confinement and forced confinement all describe the same offence under section 279(2) of the Criminal Code. The section itself does not use a title: it covers anyone who confines, imprisons or forcibly seizes another person without lawful authority. “False imprisonment” is the name for a similar wrong in a civil lawsuit, where the remedy is damages rather than a criminal penalty.

Kidnapping under section 279(1) of the Criminal Code requires that the accused move the complainant from one place to another against their will. Forcible confinement under section 279(2) requires only that the complainant's movement be restricted at a single location. The practical difference is asportation: kidnapping carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment because of the movement element, while forcible confinement carries a maximum of ten years on indictment.

Kidnapping also requires a particular intent: to have the person confined or imprisoned against their will, to send or transport them out of Canada, or to hold them for ransom or to service. It carries minimum sentences where a firearm is used, or where the person taken is under 16 and the accused is not their parent or guardian. Hostage-taking (s. 279.1) is confinement with a threat, made to force someone else to do something as the price of release, and also carries up to life.

There is no minimum time requirement in the statute. Courts have convicted accused persons for confinements lasting only a few minutes. What matters is whether the complainant's liberty was meaningfully restricted, not how long the restriction lasted. A brief confinement still qualifies, though the duration becomes relevant later at the sentencing stage.

The restraint must still last for a “significant period of time” (R v Pritchard, 2008 SCC 59). A momentary hold, or a restraint that lasts no longer than another act such as an assault, can leave room to argue there was no separate confinement.

No. Confinement can be achieved through threats, intimidation, or by blocking an exit. If a person reasonably believes they are not free to leave because of something the accused said or did, that is enough. The Crown does not need to prove the accused touched the complainant or used a weapon — only that the complainant was prevented from leaving.

Consent to be in a place can be revoked at any time. Once a complainant makes it clear they want to leave, any conduct by the accused that prevents them from doing so can form the basis of a forcible confinement charge. This often arises during arguments at home, where one person blocks a doorway, takes car keys, or refuses to let the other person out of a vehicle.

Forcible confinement is frequently laid alongside assault, sexual assault, uttering threats, or mischief in domestic disputes. A complainant may describe being held in a bedroom, having a phone taken away, or being prevented from leaving during an argument. These allegations are difficult to defend because they usually come down to the word of the complainant against the word of the accused, without independent witnesses or physical evidence. They can also surface for the first time during separation, divorce, or custody proceedings, where a criminal allegation may influence the family law outcome.

Since 2026, a confinement in which violence was used, threatened or attempted against an intimate partner can be charged under section 263.1 of the Criminal Code, with a maximum of 14 years on indictment. Read more about domestic assault charges.

The Crown must prove each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

• the accused confined, imprisoned, or forcibly seized the complainant;
• the confinement was without the complainant's consent;
• the accused had no lawful authority to confine the complainant; and
• the accused intended to confine the complainant, or knew the conduct would have that effect.

If the Crown fails on any one of these elements, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. A skilled defence lawyer will look at each element in isolation and identify which one is weakest on the evidence.

Defences depend on the facts of the case. Common defences in forcible confinement cases include:

• The complainant was not actually confined. If the complainant was free to leave at any time, no offence occurred.
• Consent. If the complainant chose to stay and later changed their account, that can undermine the Crown's case.
• Credibility and reliability. Inconsistencies between the complainant's police statement, preliminary inquiry evidence, and trial testimony can create reasonable doubt.
• Identification. If the complainant has misidentified the accused, the charge cannot succeed.
• Lawful authority. Parents restraining a child, private citizens effecting a lawful arrest, and certain caregiving situations can give rise to lawful authority.
• Self-defence or defence of another. In narrow circumstances, restraining another person to prevent harm may be justified.
• Charter challenges. Unlawful arrest, unreasonable search, or improper questioning may lead to the exclusion of key evidence.

Many forcible confinement cases are resolved before trial through careful Crown negotiation, particularly where the allegation is uncorroborated and the complainant's account shifts over time.

The Crown may prosecute forcible confinement by indictment (maximum ten years in prison) or by summary conviction (maximum two years less a day). The sentence imposed depends on the circumstances of the offence, whether a weapon was used, whether the complainant is a vulnerable person, the length of the confinement, and the accused's background.

A conviction can also carry long-term consequences beyond the sentence itself, including:

• a criminal record stored on the national CPIC database;
• a DNA order;
• a firearms prohibition, which is mandatory where the Crown proceeds by indictment and violence was used, threatened or attempted (s. 109);
• difficulty finding or keeping employment, especially in regulated fields;
• problems with immigration, permanent residence, and citizenship applications;
• denial of entry to the United States and other countries;
• restrictions in family law proceedings, including custody and access; and
• the risk of the conviction being reported publicly in the media.

No. Forcible confinement under section 279(2) has no minimum sentence, whether the Crown proceeds by indictment or summarily. Minimum sentences apply to kidnapping and hostage-taking where a firearm is used (four years, or five and seven years with a restricted or prohibited firearm or for a criminal organization), and to kidnapping a person under 16 by someone who is not their parent or guardian (five years). Since July 18, 2026, a court must go below a minimum where it would be cruel and unusual punishment for the particular offender.

Yes. For most forcible confinement charges the Crown must justify detention, and release conditions typically include no contact with the complainant and staying away from their home. The accused has to show why they should be released, by clearly demonstrating that their release plan addresses the risks, in some cases, including where the confinement is alleged against an intimate partner and the accused has a previous intimate partner violence conviction or was on a peace bond for a partner; where a weapon was used and the accused has a similar recent conviction; where the offence was committed while on release for another indictable offence; or where a kidnapping or hostage-taking was committed with a firearm. Read more about bail hearings.

Only within narrow limits. Section 43 of the Criminal Code gives a parent a defence to an assault charge for minor, corrective force on a child in their care. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld it in 2004 but excluded children under two and teenagers, the use of objects, blows or slaps to the head, and force used in anger or that causes harm. Anything outside those limits can be prosecuted as assault.

The answer is the same across Canada, because the Criminal Code is federal law. In Ontario, as in every province, a spanking is a crime unless it meets every condition of s. 43 and the limits the Supreme Court set in Canadian Foundation, 2004 SCC 4.

No. As of September 2026, s. 43 is unchanged. Bills S-251 and C-273 would have repealed it in response to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Call to Action 6, but both died when the parliamentary session ended on January 6, 2025, and neither received Royal Assent.

Section 43 applies only to minor corrective force of a transitory and trifling nature. Should the force applied cause visible injuries such as cuts or bruising, the discipline would fall outside of what is considered permissible under the section: it does not extend to force that causes harm or the prospect of harm.

Section 43 does not apply to the corporal punishment of children under the age of two or to teenagers. Corporal punishment of children outside that age range is not protected by s. 43 and can be prosecuted as an assault under Canadian criminal law. The Court noted that a parent or teacher may still reasonably restrain or remove a teenager from a situation, short of corporal punishment, and that a child of any age who cannot learn from the correction, for example because of a disability, is outside the section.

Section 43 does not apply to degrading, inhuman, or harmful conduct. Any form of punishment that meets this definition will not be protected by the legislation.

No. Discipline by using objects such as belts, canes, or slippers is not acceptable, and it can be charged as assault with a weapon. The Supreme Court did not list approved methods; it held that only minor corrective force of a transitory and trifling nature is protected, which in practice leaves little beyond a light smack with an open hand that causes no harm. Punches or kicks are also not appropriate forms of discipline. Additionally, blows or slaps to the head, including open-handed slaps, are considered unreasonable.

No. Teachers may not discipline children by using corporal punishment but they may reasonably apply force to remove a child from the classroom or to secure compliance with instructions.

No. As the conduct must be corrective, the section does not apply to a parent or caregiver’s conduct which emerges from frustration, loss of temper or abusive personality. Such conduct will fall outside of the protections of section 43 and can be prosecuted as an assault in law.

It is possible. Assault carries up to five years on indictment, or up to two years less a day if the Crown proceeds summarily, and a slap to the head is outside s. 43. Sentences depend on the facts and the person’s background, and cases can end without a jail sentence or without a conviction at all.

Police may investigate and lay an assault charge. Release conditions can restrict contact with the child or the family home while the case is open. The defence then tests the evidence against s. 43 and the Supreme Court’s limits. Speak to a criminal lawyer before you give police a statement.

Yes. Bail conditions often move the accused parent out of the home and limit contact, and the parent who keeps the children in their day-to-day care gains a status quo that family courts are reluctant to disturb. Family courts must also consider any criminal proceeding or condition relevant to the child’s safety (Divorce Act s. 16(3)(k); Children’s Law Reform Act s. 24(3)(k)).

No. Since March 1, 2021, the Divorce Act and the Children’s Law Reform Act speak of decision-making responsibility, parenting time and contact, set out in a parenting order. Orders made under the old words remain valid.

No. Both statutes define family violence to include threatening conduct, coercive and controlling behaviour and conduct that causes fear, whether or not it is a criminal offence, and, for a child, direct or indirect exposure to it.

Visits or exchanges supervised by a consenting person, a children’s aid society or a supervised access centre (Children’s Law Reform Act s. 34; Divorce Act s. 16.1(8)). It is the exception, but may be ordered where a parent has been violent to a spouse or child.

No. Where a Criminal Code order and a provincial family order conflict, the criminal order prevails. Bail can be changed only through the criminal court, on consent (s. 519.1) or by a bail review (s. 520), often by adding an exception for contact under a family court order.

A peace bond is a Criminal Code recognizance under s. 810, lasting up to 12 months, and breaching it carries up to four years. A restraining order is made by a family court under s. 46 of the Family Law Act or s. 35 of the Children’s Law Reform Act. Neither is a criminal conviction.

Yes. Bail conditions can bar you from the home, and a family court can grant your spouse exclusive possession of the matrimonial home regardless of ownership (Family Law Act s. 24), considering, among other things, any violence against the spouse or children. Breaching an exclusive possession order is an offence.

Since July 17, 2026, an offence involving violence used, threatened or attempted against a current or former spouse, common-law or dating partner can be charged under Criminal Code s. 263.1, which raises the maximum sentence one step, for example from five to ten years for a threat to cause death.

Not as punishment. Under the Divorce Act the court cannot consider misconduct itself (s. 15.2(5)), but it can consider its consequences, such as abuse that leaves the other spouse unable to work (Leskun v Leskun, 2006 SCC 25). Under Ontario’s Family Law Act, only conduct that is an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship affects the amount (s. 33(10)).

Retain both a criminal lawyer and a family lawyer, comply with every bail condition, and ask for bail terms that let a family court decide parenting time.

Section 34 of the Criminal Code. You are not guilty of an offence if you believed on reasonable grounds that force or a threat of force was being used against you or someone else, you acted to defend or protect yourself or them, and what you did was reasonable in the circumstances. The court weighs the factors listed in s. 34(2) to decide reasonableness.

There is no rule that you must retreat. Whether there were other means available to respond is one factor in deciding whether your act was reasonable (s. 34(2)(b)), weighed with the others; no single factor is decisive (R v Khill, 2021 SCC 37).

No. In R v Docherty, 2012 ONCA 784, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that there is no duty to retreat from your own home in the face of an attack, and ordered a new trial because the jury had been told Mr. Docherty’s failure to retreat was a factor. A judge or jury may still consider other steps you could have taken inside the home to avoid the confrontation.

It is the factor in s. 34(2)(c). The Supreme Court held in Khill that it covers everything the accused did from the beginning of the incident to the end that bears on whether the final act was reasonable, and is not limited to unlawful or provocative conduct.

Not against an officer doing what the law requires or authorizes, unless you believe on reasonable grounds the officer is acting unlawfully (ss. 34(3) and 35(3)). Whether an officer acted lawfully is often decided later, in court, so physical resistance is risky.

Yes, if you are in peaceable possession of it, you reasonably believe someone is entering it, taking it or damaging it, you act to stop that or to remove them, and your act is reasonable in the circumstances (s. 35).

No. Canadian courts have held that deadly force is not reasonable in defence of property alone, where no one’s life or safety is also threatened. A threat inside a home often does endanger the people in it, and then self-defence under s. 34 applies.

They removed the old rule that only a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm could justify causing death or grievous bodily harm. Deadly force is now judged under the same reasonableness test as any other act, with the nature of the threat and proportionality as listed factors (s. 34(2)(a) and (g)). It remains permitted only in very exceptional circumstances.

Yes. Anyone may arrest a person found committing an indictable offence, or a person they reasonably believe has committed a criminal offence and is being freshly pursued by people with authority to arrest. Property owners and their authorized agents have a wider power for offences on or in relation to their property (Criminal Code s. 494).

Yes. The owner, a person in lawful possession of the property, or someone they authorize, may arrest a person found committing a criminal offence on or in relation to it, either at the time or within a reasonable time afterward if it is not feasible for police to make the arrest (s. 494(2)).

As much as is necessary, acting on reasonable grounds (s. 25(1), s. 494(4)). Force intended or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm is not justified unless you believe on reasonable grounds it is necessary to protect yourself or someone under your protection from death or grievous bodily harm (s. 25(3)).

Deliver the person to a peace officer forthwith (s. 494(3)). Holding someone longer, or arresting without the power to do so, can lead to charges against you.

It received Royal Assent on June 28, 2012 and came into force on March 11, 2013 (S.C. 2012, c. 9; SI/2013-5). It replaced ss. 34 to 42 of the Criminal Code with the current ss. 34 and 35 and amended s. 494. Those sections have not been amended since.

Yes. Self-defence is one of several defences available to someone facing an assault charge. If it is raised on the evidence, the Crown must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt (R v Khill, 2021 SCC 37).

Yes. Uttering threats is a criminal offence under section 264.1 of the Criminal Code. It is a hybrid offence, so the Crown can prosecute it by indictment or by summary conviction.

Section 264.1 of the Criminal Code defines uttering threats broadly. A person may be charged if they utter, convey, or cause someone to receive a threat:

• To cause death or bodily harm to any person
• To burn, destroy or damage real or personal property
• To kill, poison, or injure an animal belonging to someone else

The law considers an utterance to be any spoken or written statement that conveys a threat. To secure a conviction, the Crown must prove that the accused meant the words to intimidate or to be taken seriously. It does not have to prove that anyone was actually afraid.

Yes. The accused does not need to communicate the threat directly to the intended victim. The offence is complete if the accused makes the threat to a third party. Courts have ruled that it is irrelevant whether the accused expected the third party to pass along the message or whether the intended victim ever learned about it.

Threats can be made verbally, in writing, or through electronic communication such as email, text, or social media.

Yes. The offence covers a threat made “in any manner”, so a text, email, direct message or social media post is treated the same way as words spoken aloud. The same two questions apply: would a reasonable person see the message as a threat, and did the sender mean it to intimidate or to be taken seriously? In online cases, whether the accused actually wrote or sent the message is often disputed.

To convict someone of uttering threats, the Crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. A threat was made. The statement—spoken, written, or electronic—conveyed a message that a reasonable person, aware of all the circumstances, would see as a threat of death, bodily harm, property damage or harm to an animal.
2. The threat was directed at a person or a group. It can target an identifiable individual, or an ascertained group of people, even if they were not present when it was made.
3. The accused intended to threaten. The Crown must show the accused meant the words to intimidate or to be taken seriously. Lack of intent can serve as a defence.
4. The words are judged objectively. Courts assess how a reasonable, fully informed person in the same situation would understand the words, not whether the person threatened actually felt threatened.

No. Courts focus on the meaning of the words and the intent of the person making the statement. Even if the recipient laughed it off or dismissed the words, the offence is established if the accused meant the statement to intimidate or to be taken seriously.

The recipient's reaction can still matter as evidence of what the accused meant. In R v O'Brien, 2013 SCC 2, the complainant's evidence that she was not frightened helped leave the trial judge with a reasonable doubt about the accused's intent.

Impossibility does not eliminate liability. For example, a statement such as "I'll throw you off the CN Tower" may still qualify as a threat. What matters is whether the words were intended to intimidate or to be taken seriously, not whether the accused had the ability or the intention to act on them.

The main defences are that the words were not a threat in context, that the accused did not intend to threaten, that it did not happen the way it is alleged, and that evidence was obtained in breach of the Charter. Each is explained in the defences section above.

Yes. The Crown can withdraw a charge where the evidence does not support it. Some threat charges are resolved by the accused agreeing to a peace bond under section 810 — a promise to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for up to 12 months, usually with conditions — in exchange for the charge being withdrawn. A peace bond is not a criminal conviction.

There is no minimum sentence for uttering threats, so a discharge is legally available, which means a finding of guilt without a conviction being registered (s. 730). Whether that is realistic depends on the words, the context, the relationship and the person's background. Even for first-time offenders, the consequences of a conviction can be devastating.

Uttering threats carries severe legal penalties:

• By indictment: Maximum of five years' imprisonment for a threat of death or bodily harm, and two years for a threat to property or an animal
• By summary conviction: Maximum of two years less a day, a fine of up to $5,000, or both
• Against an intimate partner: Since July 2026, a threat of death or bodily harm against a current or former partner can be charged under s. 263.1, with a maximum of 10 years on indictment

Fines may also accompany jail time. Beyond legal punishment, a conviction results in a criminal record, which can:

• Limit employment opportunities
• Restrict international travel
• Impact personal and professional relationships
• Create housing difficulties

Even for first-time offenders, the consequences can be devastating.

Since July 2026, section 263.1 of the Criminal Code lets the Crown charge an offence in which violence is used, threatened or attempted against an intimate partner — a current or former spouse, common-law partner or dating partner — as a separate offence. It raises the maximum sentence on indictment by one step: an offence with a maximum of five years, such as a threat of death or bodily harm, becomes 10 years. The rules that apply to the underlying offence otherwise continue to apply. The new offence applies only to conduct after it came into force.

It can. The court must consider a weapons prohibition order for any offence in which violence was threatened, lasting up to 10 years, or up to life where the threat was against an intimate partner or family member (s. 110). If the Crown proceeds by indictment and the threat was against an intimate partner, a child or parent, or someone living in the home, a prohibition is mandatory (s. 109).